

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 14 MAY 95		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE UN CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS IN CYPRUS AND LEBANON				5. FUNDING NUMBER DTIC SELECTED NOV 08 1995 B	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAY, MICHAEL D. WINSTEAD					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FT. LEVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 ATTN: ATEL - SCVV COMBAT (913) 758-3300				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FT LEVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) THIS MONOGRAPH EXAMINES FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS BY FIRST LOOKING AT THE UN CHAPTER AND US ARMY FIELD MANUAL 100-23, <u>PEACE OPERATIONS</u> . THE CHAPTER AND SECTIONS OF FM 100-23 WERE THEN USED TO ANALYZE UN CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS IN CYPRUS AND LEBANON FOR LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 60	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT		

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 8

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to **stay within the lines** to meet **optical scanning requirements**.

Block 1. Agency Use Only (Leave blank).

Block 2. Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. Type of Report and Dates Covered. State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

C - Contract	PR - Project
G - Grant	TA - Task
PE - Program Element	WU - Work Unit Accession No.

Block 6. Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 8. Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 10. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. (If known)

Block 11. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in...: When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement. Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

DOD - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."

DOE - See authorities.

NASA - See Handbook NHB 2200.2.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 12b. Distribution Code.

DOD - Leave blank.

DOE - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.

NASA - Leave blank.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 13. Abstract. Include a brief (*Maximum 200 words*) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. Price Code. Enter appropriate price code (*NTIS only*).

Blocks 17. - 19. Security Classifications. Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.

UN CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS IN CYPRUS AND LEBANON

A Monograph
By
Major Michael D. Winstead
Infantry



19951107 097

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 94-95

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Michael D. Winstead


Title of Monograph: UN Chapter VI Operations in Cyprus and
Lebanon

Approved by:




LTC Gregory M. Eckert, MS, MMAS

Monograph Director



COL Gregory Fontenot, MA, MMAS

Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate
Degree Program

Accepted this 19th Day of May 1995

ABSTRACT

UN CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS IN CYPRUS AND LEBANON by MAJ Michael D. Winstead, USA, 60 pages.

This monograph discusses how the current world situation and the Clinton Administration's commitment to the United Nations has made peace operations an important part of U.S. armed forces' missions. The goal of the monograph is to validate current U.S. Army peacekeeping doctrine using two historical case studies.

The monograph first conducts a review of the foundations for peace operations by looking at the UN charter. Next, the current U.S. Army doctrine, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, December 1994, is examined. Particular attention is paid to that manual's five peace operation campaign planning considerations. Those considerations are: 1) the UN mandate and Terms Of Reference, 2) development of the ROE, 3) the Media, NGOs, PVOs, and coalition partners as primary players, 4) friendly and belligerent centers of gravity, 5) concepts for transition and termination.

The monograph then examines an historical case study in Cyprus. United Nations Forces in Cyprus or UNFICYP is a long standing UN peacekeeping mission designed to prevent ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Its authority stems from the UN charter, specifically chapter VI. The lessons for peacekeeping from Cyprus are explored using the five planning considerations of FM 100-23 as an analytical tool.

Using the same considerations, the monograph next examines the case study of Lebanon. United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon or UNIFIL provides additional lessons for chapter VI operations. UNIFIL is primarily a case of inter-state conflict as opposed to ethnic strife. Coupled with UNFICYP, these operations are representative of the large majority of peacekeeping missions.

In conclusion the monograph shows the validity of FM 100-23 and the five planning considerations for peace operation campaigns. Additionally, those areas of the planning considerations that require more detail are explained. The intent is to offer sufficient detail in planning considerations to make them more useful in actual operations.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. The Doctrine of Peacekeeping	3
III. United Nations Forces In Cyprus (UNFICYP)	8
IV. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	29
V. Conclusions.....	44
Endnotes	49
Bibliography	57

UN Chapter VI Operations in Cyprus and Lebanon

I. INTRODUCTION

In the current U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, global political stability and economic progress figure prominently. For the U.S., this strategy means an increased commitment to United Nations' peace operations.¹ Since the end of Desert Storm, our armed forces have conducted humanitarian missions in Bangladesh, Somalia, Florida, Hawaii, and Rwanda. They have also supplied a battalion sized unit to UNPROFOR's mission in Macedonia, restored democracy in Haiti, and fought combat actions in Somalia in an attempt to further UN goals for that nation. The involvement of U.S. armed forces in peace operations will probably continue.

Peace operations are not new to the U.S. armed forces. American military observers participated in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Israel as early as 1948. What is new is the growing size, frequency, and complexity of peace operations. Nearly all of these missions are expected to be conducted under United Nations auspices. In acknowledgment of the multinational nature of peace operations and in an attempt to establish more rigor and consistency for U.S. participation in them, Presidential Decision Directive 25, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations was issued in May, 1994.²

PDD 25 lists the criteria for U.S. involvement in peace operations. PDD 25 says that the U.S. will remain committed to UN peace operations. The policy stresses traditional peacekeeping, or Chapter VI missions, with multilateral

participation, over peace enforcement, Chapter VII missions. PDD 25 notes, "For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a cease-fire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed."³

The policy goes on to say that for U.S. participation in Chapter VII peace enforcement operations, the threat to international peace and security should be considered significant.⁴

In December 1994, as a result of PDD 25 and the growing U.S. involvement in peace operations, the U.S. Army published FM 100-23, Peace Operations. This manual describes Chapter VI operations as, peacekeeping characterized by high levels of consent from the belligerents, low requirement for use of force by the peacekeepers, and the need to maintain impartiality. Chapter VII operations are characterized by low levels of consent from the belligerents with the corresponding need for greater use of force by the Chapter VII unit. Since the UN's first peace operation in 1948, there has been only one Chapter VII operation. Consistent with PDD 25's emphasis, this monograph will be limited to an examination of Chapter VI doctrine, and two related case studies, Cyprus and Lebanon.

Among the concepts introduced in FM 100-23, is a five step process to design successful peace operation campaign plans. The five steps or areas for consideration are: 1) consider the UN mandate and Terms of Reference, 2) consider development of the Rules of Engagement or ROE, 3) consider media, Non-Governmental Organizations-NGOs, Private Voluntary Organizations-PVOs, and allies as primary players, 4) consider friendly and belligerent centers of gravity,

and 5) develop a concept for transition and termination. This monograph uses the two case studies of Cyprus and Lebanon to determine the extent the five considerations identified in FM 100-23 are valid in designing a peace operation campaign.

The UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus is included as an example of a UN mission designed to prevent intra-state ethnic violence, complicated by regional and international concerns. This is a major sub-type, of Chapter VI missions and its study is relevant to current conditions in many parts of the world. The second case study, Lebanon, demonstrates inter-state conflict that threatens international peace and security.⁵ This sub-type, along with the Cyprus sub-type constitute the large majority of all peacekeeping missions.

This monograph is organized into five sections. The first is the introduction. The second section is a review of the doctrine of peacekeeping, primarily from FM 100-23. The third section is a case study of the Chapter VI operation, United Nations Forces In Cyprus (UNFICYP). The fourth section examines the chapter VI operation of United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL). The fifth section concludes by noting that FM 100-23's five considerations for peace operation campaign planning are effective, but require more detail to better address the issues of peacekeeping.

II. The Doctrine of Peacekeeping

Any examination of multinational peacekeeping doctrine must start with the UN Charter. In the years since 1945, Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter have become the foundation for the current concepts of peace operations.

Peacekeeping, or Chapter VI missions, involve the use of military force, under considerable constraints, to enhance international peace and stability. Peacekeeping requires understanding both the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. Chapter VI discusses how parties to a dispute should consent to UN intercession. While no part of the chapter actually mentions peacekeeping forces,⁶ history suggests that tightly controlled military forces are one of the most useful instruments in implementing the provisions of the chapter.⁷ As many former UN Secretary Generals, UN members, and peacekeeping force commanders have noted, Chapter VI missions are most effective when all parties to a dispute perceive the peacekeepers to be completely neutral.⁸

As FM 100-23 counsels, "PK enjoys high levels of consent and impartiality and low levels of force (generally only in self defense) while PE [peace enforcement or Chapter VII operations] is marked by the reverse."⁹ Additionally, the manual says that in Chapter VI missions, the absolute minimum use of force is critical.¹⁰ Excessive force could lead to failure of the mission. ROE is the key to controlling force and maintaining acceptance for the peacekeeping operation with the belligerent parties.

FM 100-23 states that peace operations create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to flourish.¹¹ As discussed above, five considerations are deemed critical for a successful peace operation campaign plan. The considerations are: 1) consider the mandate and Terms Of Reference, 2) consider development of the ROE, 3) consider the media, NGOs, PVOs, and allies as primary players, 4) consider friendly and belligerent parties' centers of gravity, and 5) develop a

concept for transition and termination.¹² These considerations are addressed in somewhat greater detail in various parts of the manual.

FM 100-23 discusses the climate in which a UN mandate is prepared and certain key considerations. These considerations include the role of the peace operation force, organization of the forces, financial arrangements, limitations, host nation conditions, and rights of the peacekeepers.¹³ Something closely linked to the mandate are the Terms Of Reference. The term, Terms Of Reference, did not surface until the mid 1970's. Terms Of Reference is the method now used to describe the contract written by the UN Secretary General. This contract is under the approval of the UN Security Council for the operation of a UN peacekeeping force.

As a concept and term, it is not well defined in the manual. The Terms Of Reference are described as a follow-on to the mandate. No mention is made of who issues the Terms Of Reference or what its actual purpose is in establishing a peacekeeping operation. Some of these questions can be answered by examining the sample Terms Of Reference listed in Annex A of the manual. The following subjects are typically covered in the Terms of Reference: purpose of the mission, authority by UN Security Council resolution, timing, command relationships, organization, logistics, and responsibilities of the UN forces.¹⁴

The section on ROE is well developed and discusses the importance of ROE in the success of a peacekeeping mission. FM 100-23 states that ROE are the guidelines on how and when a military unit may employ force in accomplishing its assigned mission. Because peacekeeping operations are usually politically

sensitive, ROE will be highly scrutinized by the UN, the peacekeeping forces, and the disputing factions. Usually, the UN will be concerned with maintaining international peace and security. The peacekeeping forces' concern will be force protection. The disputing factions' concerns will focus on impartiality. As the case studies will show, these concerns are frequently at odds with each other. Self protection ROE for the peacekeeper is based on the requirement for hostile intent. Belligerents must demonstrate hostile intent towards the peacekeeper before self protection ROE allows a forceful response. All of the views do and should have a role in developing ROE, as stated in FM 100-23¹⁵.

In Chapter VI missions, peacekeeping forces are often placed into likely areas of conflict. The intent is that the impartiality of the peacekeeping forces will deter further fighting. This, along with self protection ROE, is expected to prevent harm coming to the peacekeeper while still accomplishing the mission. At the same time, the peacekeeper must be able to conduct any humanitarian duties without obstruction from any of the factions.¹⁶ This implies the belligerent parties consent to the UN mission.

FM 100-23 states that planners should consider friendly and belligerent parties' centers of gravity when designing a campaign plan for a peace operation. No further mention is made in FM 100-23 concerning the value of the concept or the usefulness of determining what are the centers of gravity. Center of gravity is a troublesome concept to tie down to any one particular definition. Current Army manuals differ on what exactly constitutes the centers of gravity. This monograph will use the definition for center of gravity from FM 100-23 itself. The manual

states that a "center of gravity is the hub of all power and movement... from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight." As FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993, the U.S. Army's keystone doctrinal manual notes:

the concept of center of gravity is useful as an analytical tool to cause the joint commander and his staff to think about their own and the enemy's sources of strength as they design the campaign and determine its objectives.¹⁷

FM 100-5 goes on to say that a center of gravity can include the mass of the army, public opinion, national will, and an alliance or coalition structure.¹⁸ The two case studies will demonstrate that, similar to conventional operations, the value of determining centers of gravity lies as much in the analysis as in finding out what they are.

FM 100-23 describes the relationship with the media, NGOs, PVOs, and coalition partners as one of coordination and cooperation.¹⁹ The manual counsels planners to remember that allies often interpret missions and orders differently. FM 100-23 discusses several prominent NGOs and PVOs and describes how a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is useful in dealing with these humanitarian organizations. The UN uses different terms for this liaison mission such as Operation Economics or OE. OE is similar to a CMOC, but with some differences in structure and procedure based on the UN's different experiences with NGOs and PVOs. Additionally, the UN has its own doctrine on media relations found in the Peacekeeper's Handbook, 1984. That handbook describes, among other things, the desirability of centralized press releases under the coordination of a UN Press Information Office (PIO). Press releases by national contingents

without consent of the PIO is highly discouraged. However, the emphasis on cooperation and coordination in both doctrines is the same, as the two case studies will demonstrate.

The final consideration of transition and termination involves two types, transition to another organization from the U.S., and transition from one type of peace operation to another. FM 100-23 notes that the factors for concern with both types of transitions are achievement of a successful endstate, determination of who the future players will be, determination of the types of transition activities to be performed, and determination of the centers of gravity of the belligerents. However, no examples are provided to add detail to what types of coordination are required. The case studies will help explain the difficulties and planning factors required with this consideration.

III. UNFICYP

BACKGROUND. Understanding the problems in Cyprus requires understanding the issues facing not only the international community, but the Greek, and Turkish ethnic groups as well. Cyprus is an island nation consisting of two major ethnic groups. Approximately 80 percent of the population is Greek and 18 percent is Turkish. The remainder consists of foreign nationals and military personnel, mostly British.²⁰ During the first half of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom maintained Cyprus as a crown colony. In the post Suez Crisis period, most European powers rushed to rid themselves of colonial ties. In the case of Cyprus, this process was assisted by Greece and Turkey, the island's anti-colonial benefactors. Cyprus became a sovereign nation on 16 August, 1960

in accordance with negotiations reached between Greece, Turkey, and the UK on 11 February, 1959. Representatives of the island's Greek and Turkish ethnic communities also participated in these talks. The Greek Cypriots, as the majority, actually desired union with Greece. The Turkish minority, realizing their precarious position, desired partition from Greek Cyprus.²¹ Both Greece and Turkey supported their own ethnic groups' views on the island.²² This ethnic tension continues to be the most significant of several factors preventing a solution of the Cyprus problem.

Another factor in the Cyprus problem involved the international situation during the Cold War. Greece, Turkey, and the UK, who were the chief negotiators over the Cyprus issue, were NATO allies. The ethnic tensions on Cyprus brought emotional reactions in both Greece and Turkey. Each nation wanted to protect their ethnic communities. Turkey in particular, saw the Turkish Cypriots at risk of being eliminated by the Greek majority. Disputes between the two NATO partners became so strong that open warfare became a possibility.²³ War between NATO members bordering the USSR, at the height of the Cold War, was highly undesirable. Therefore, the U.S. and NATO pushed for a quick solution to the problem to avoid a divisive war. The result was a compromise solution that did not solve the basic issues.²⁴

The solution of 1959 provided a constitution that established Cyprus as a republic. The constitution guaranteed that each division of the population would be protected by its appropriate benefactor, e.g., Turkey for the Turkish Cypriots and Greece for the Greek Cypriots. This arrangement offered each community a

chance to maintain the status quo. As a result, both Turkey and Greece maintained military contingents on the island, along with the British. Neither a unification by any ethnic community in part or whole with another nation, nor a partitioning of the island was allowed by the accords of 1959.²⁵ This solution presented a unique problem for Cyprus. Because of the pre-existing tension between Greece and Turkey, any intervention to maintain the status quo by one would be seen as plain aggression by the other. As events would prove, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were unable to solve their differences.

A review of the formation of the Cypriot government is necessary to understand why the Cyprus conflict erupted in late 1963. The 1960 Cyprus Constitution attempted to represent all parties fairly. The President of the republic was to be from the Greek community and the Vice President from the Turkish community. A system of checks and balances theoretically ensured that each ethnic group received a voice in the government. In practice, the daily running of the country was severely hampered by an overly bureaucratic dual control system. Archbishop Makarios, first President of Cyprus, attempted to make a change to the original Constitution on 30 November, 1963 after three years of difficulties with the established system.²⁶ This became a catalyst for violence.

Makarios, a Greek Cypriot, put forth a proposal that might have improved the government's operations, but it also included options for majority rule in many areas of the government. The Turkish community, feeling threatened, accused the President and the Greek community of renegeing on the original Constitution and within a few days violent disturbances erupted around Nicosia, the nation's capitol.

Feeling that the Turkish minority was in danger, the Turkish national contingent deployed forces around the capitol on 24 December, 1963. This action while in keeping with the 1959 security agreements, caused much consternation in Greece and with the NATO allies.²⁷

On the same day, Greece, Turkey, and the UK offered to restore the peace if requested by the legitimate Cypriot government. Cyprus accepted the proposal and on 30 December, 1963 the three countries established a cease fire. Military forces, mostly British, enforced the cease fire along a buffer zone, known as the Green Line, which ran through the middle of Nicosia.²⁸ However, this arrangement with British, Greek, and Turkish national military contingents acting as peacekeepers, was not completely acceptable to the Cypriots. Cyprus' representative to the United Nations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council seeking its help. While the UN Security Council (UNSC) debated what to do, the government of Turkey declared that if assaults on Turkish Cypriots continued, Turkey would invade the island. With the worsening situation on Cyprus and the threat of Turkish intervention, the UNSC adopted resolution 187 (UNSCR 187) on 13 March, 1964. This resolution, along with UNSCR 186, established United Nations' Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), under Chapter VI authority. The initial authorization for UNFICYP was for three months with Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani of India designated as force commander.²⁹

THE UN MANDATE. Before the mid 1970's, UN Security Council mandates, resolutions and statements by the UN Secretary General served as the Terms Of Reference. Thus, while analysis of the Cyprus mission will not include

the term,³⁰ Cyprus still is useful in identifying considerations associated with the concept. The original UN mandate of three months established a force of roughly 6,000 peacekeepers from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK. The UK units were the original units stationed on the island that had helped with the cease fire in December 1963. According to UNSCR 186, the UN forces were to "prevent the recurrence of fighting, to maintain law and order, and to promote a return to normal conditions".³¹ At the time UNSCR 186 was enacted, the UN Secretary General and the UNSC planned to review UNFICYP after three months to decide if the mandate should be continued.³²

The peacekeeping forces deployed throughout the island to locations where tension was likely, usually where Greek and Turkish elements lived in close proximity to each other. The UN force commanders attempted to place peacekeeping forces between hostile factions to separate them by peaceful means. The method most often used to do this involved infiltrating platoon or company sized UN contingents into an area under the cover of darkness. Once morning came, the warring ethnic factions found UN peacekeepers juxtaposed between their lines and thus, further bloodshed was prevented. This was effective because most of the ethnic violence occurred during the day. Although such methods were not always necessary, they represented the spirit of the mandate and chapter VI operations.³³

This was entirely in keeping with the UN charter. Under its Chapter VI provisions, and as the UN Secretary stated at the time, all parties needed to agree to and approve each nation's contribution to peacekeeping operations. Fundamentally,

this condition required UNFICYP's forces to maintain impartiality towards all Cypriots. Failure to maintain impartiality could have led to failure of the whole mission and a European war, something that neither the UN nor NATO could afford.³⁴ Thus, the UN Secretary General formulated the mandate based on his concept of a non-violent Chapter VI operation, keeping in mind the international significance of a peaceful Cyprus. The Secretary General appreciated that understanding the country in which peacekeeping takes place is not enough. Peacekeepers had to see the wider context in which the crisis developed. During this early phase of operations, the UN Secretary General had time to develop his plan for UNFICYP and peacekeeping. After studying force commander comments and reports during the first six months, the Secretary issued his new plan for the conduct of UNFICYP.

In September 1964, the UNSG and the UNSC issued a more detailed list of principles for UNFICYP along with the second renewal. Those principles resembled the Terms Of Reference as defined in FM 100-23. They also included some items that applied to ROE. Essentially, the principles stated that the forces of a peacekeeping operation were under the control of the UNSC and the Secretary General. In the Secretary's words, peacekeepers were introduced to the conflict to prevent war, not continue it. Additionally, UN forces were to be lightly armed and shoot only in self defense. With this statement the Secretary General attempted to establish his leadership role in the control of peacekeeping forces.³⁵

A small but important lesson from this is that documents issued by the UN may have multiple purposes. The Secretary's September 1964 statement was

essentially an updated mandate, however, he also included his concept for UNFICYP's use of force in the execution of its peacekeeping duties. Therefore, the force commander used the mandate to derive not only his mission, but also his ROE. Had the force commander failed to pay close attention to all portions of the mandate, he might not have properly implemented all of the UN Secretary General's guidance on UNFICYP's operations.³⁶

As already stated, a major theme in the mandate for UNFICYP was the need to remain impartial. Key to remaining impartial was understanding how each of the factions in the conflict viewed the mandate. It was nearly impossible to maintain impartiality unless the peacekeepers understood what each party expected of them. Greek Cypriots viewed the UN mandate differently than Turkish Cypriots.

The official Cypriot government, mainly Greek, viewed the mandate as allowing UNFICYP units to assist in quelling what amounted to, in its opinion, a Turkish rebellion. This included establishing control over all the island under the new majority rule Constitution with President Makarios as head of state. The Turkish Cypriots felt UNFICYP's mission was to restore the island's status quo as written in the 1960 Constitution. That constitution had special protective clauses to prevent a majority rule, thus protecting the rights of minority Turks. Therefore, any action by UNFICYP that advanced the provisions of majority rule did not sit well with Turkish Cypriots. In an effort to appear neutral to all parties, force commanders censured their press releases and official visits so as not to show too much support for either side.³⁷ Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots felt that

UNFICYP would use force to compel rebellious factions to conform to their views.³⁸ These views, however, matched neither the letter nor spirit of the UN mandate.

The attitudes displayed by the Greek and Turkish communities illustrated their different interpretations of the UNSC's and the Secretary General's intention for the mandate. Also evident was that no one had bothered to educate Cypriots on the purpose and spirit of Chapter VI operations as a whole.³⁹ The guidelines of the mandate were in keeping with Chapter VI's Article 38:

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.⁴⁰

In fact, articles 33 to 37 of Chapter VI even go so far as to say that such disputes are best settled legally through the International Court of Justice at the Hague.⁴¹

The first and only assigned military mission of UNFICYP was to separate the hostile Greek and Turkish factions by peaceful means. But, a part of successfully accomplishing that one mission was the education of the Cypriots. Peacekeepers, in their daily dealings with the people, had to teach Greek and Turkish Cypriots that UNFICYP's purpose was prevention of bloodshed through impartial means. The UNSC, Secretary General, and political leaders had the responsibility of finding a long term solution to the problems of Cyprus. The failure by the political leaders in finding that long term solution is why UNFICYP continues today.⁴²

ROE IN UNFICYP OPERATIONS. Part of the difficulty of developing ROE in Cyprus concerned the dispensing of humanitarian aid. ROE was clearly

defined for force protection by the UN Secretary General' September 1964 statement. In some cases though, the peacekeepers were prevented from accomplishing humanitarian duties. ROE concerning humanitarian aid blockades by hostile factions was ambiguous. Although peacekeepers themselves were not threatened, the mission as a whole was. Refugees prevented from receiving relief aid tended to opt for violent retaliation against the opposing ethnic faction that stood in the way. As a result, a critical question for UNFICYP personnel became, could or should a peacekeeper use force to help needy civilians when other armed factions stood in the way?⁴³

Cyprus was the first instance of this dilemma and it continues today in the Balkans, the Middle East, and with nearly all UN missions. Solving the problem in Cyprus required judgment and patience. Indiscriminate use of force could have quickly destroyed the special status that UNFICYP personnel enjoyed. Daily contacts and a good rapport with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots allowed UNFICYP peacekeepers to overcome this problem with time. There were no quick or easy solutions. Acts of kindness, firm and consistent action, and impartiality helped establish the good rapport necessary for success.⁴⁴

In executing UNFICYP's mandate, the Secretary General could not see the sense in peacekeepers participating in the fighting. Under his standards, force was only to be applied in self defense. However, operations in Cyprus showed how ROE also was affected by the characteristics of each national peacekeeping contingent. The soldiers of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden were reluctant to use force even when clearly authorized to do so by the ROE. For example, in October

1966, a Swedish unit cornered a Greek terrorist group after that group had shot several Turks. The Swedish soldiers decided that they had no right to take action after the fact and let the terrorists escape with their weapons. A review by the force commander determined that the Swedish soldiers were in fact authorized to use force against the terrorists. This type of action encouraged the conflict to continue because it failed to prevent violence and undermined the good rapport established by most of the other units.⁴⁵

Experience gained during UNFICYP showed that two factors, more than any others, helped prevent violence. These were local superiority in combat power and a firmly enforced mandate. Units that conducted continuous and extensive patrolling were most effective. This allowed them to establish effective human intelligence and identify trouble spots early. Trouble spots could then be reinforced with heavier forces that prevented violence. The most stable areas of Cyprus were those areas where units consistently operated in this way. Unfortunately, national contingent sectors were never rotated and units always operated in the same areas. This was good for the Cypriots in well ordered areas and bad for those in areas where less effective units operated.⁴⁶

Firmness, professional competence, and an overwhelming display of force were critical to protection, effective use of the ROE, and prevention of violence in the spirit of Chapter VI of the UN charter. The self defense ROE proved workable when backed up by units with sufficient combat power under resolute and determined leadership. Units from nations that were reluctant to enforce the ROE only encouraged more violence. For the most part, the ROE used on Cyprus were

effective, but required judgment and firmness in application. UNFICYP continues today as an operational, if not political success, partly because of the generally good ROE execution by the units.

MEDIA, NGOs, AND PVOs IN CYPRUS. In any conflict or peace operation, government agencies and military forces are not the only elements that will interact with the factions in conflict. News media, private voluntary organizations (PVO's), and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) will also have a role. All these organizations are likely to be on the scene of a long standing problem area prior to the peacekeeping forces' introduction.⁴⁷ Initially, they may understand the issues and problems of the area better than anyone else.⁴⁸

The media organizations will have a myriad of interests depending on their political leanings, target audience, and type of communication, i.e., print, radio, or film used. This suggests a need for openness and honesty when dealing with them.⁴⁹ Any particular differences or anomalies in the official reporting by a UN spokesman can lead to mistrust and outright condemnation by these organizations.⁵⁰

In Cyprus, the media reported incidents and operations based on their constituents' background. Turkish press reported the Turkish view of the conflict. Turkish newspapers were quick to point out that the Turkish Cypriot community was in peril because of the Greek majority's violent persecution of them, and the governmental attempt to convert the island to majority rule. Greek media usually countered with facts about the longer standing Greek claim to the island and the superiority of majority rule, a rule generally accepted in the western world. The media of other nations such as those of the UK. and U.S. tended to be more

objective. Press from those nations tended to look for indications of the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping force at solving Cyprus' problems.⁵¹ This difference in media coverage presented UN peacekeepers with a dilemma.

Incidents were reported differently depending on which media organization provided the coverage. As the old saying suggests, a picture is worth a thousand words. As a result, reports with pictures or video tended to exert a more powerful influence in the international arena than print or radio. Therefore, small incidents with video or picture coverage sometimes had more affect than more important events that were not so covered.⁵² Press briefings given by the UN staff or force commander were only effective at presenting the UN position if the various media were willing to listen. The lessons learned on Cyprus were incorporated into the 1984 edition of the United Nations' Peacekeeper's Handbook. The press relations section of that book reflect a mature understanding of the difficulties of media affairs in a peacekeeping operation.

The guidelines laid down in UN policy in the Peacekeeper's Handbook are instructive.⁵³ The thrust of the press section is that the UN needs one voice for its account of the peacekeeping mission. That voice is the force commander's, usually provided through the Press Information Officer or PIO. The manual discourages national contingent commanders and staffs from making statements without the approval of the PIO. In some cases in Cyprus, national contingent commanders were speaking to the press directly. These subordinate commanders had not cleared their stories through the force commander. In some situations, their press releases were at odds with the official UN position. An example of this occurred

with the same Swedish incident of October 1966 already mentioned. When the Swedes allowed a Greek terrorist group to escape, other units in the force complained to the press. The other contingents felt that the Swedish action encouraged violence and threatened to provoke a Turkish invasion. This proved very embarrassing to the UNFICYP force commander and potentially dangerous to relations with Turkey.⁵⁴

The long and continuing mission in Cyprus showed a need for the PIO and centralized press coordination. Without some form of centralized coordination, the media tended to solicit unsubstantiated reports from subordinate units or personnel. In some cases, those reports jeopardized the UN's credibility and the mission as a whole.⁵⁵

Normally, PVOs and NGOs are concerned with humanitarian missions. Cyprus broke new ground for the coordination of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. A staff section at UNFICYP headquarters known as Operation Economics or OE was established. OE was the staff section responsible for coordinating UN operations with all outside humanitarian organizations⁵⁶ OE consisted of a major or lieutenant-colonel, two or three captains, and several enlisted assistants. OE was loosely associated with the UNFICYP's operations staff. Additionally, each national contingent appointed a liaison officer to OE for coordination purposes.

In Cyprus, OE coordinated a wide range of activities that were either direct humanitarian missions or supported PVOs and NGOs in their conduct of the same. The humanitarian missions performed by UNFICYP's military forces included

harvesting crops in disputed areas, repairing utilities, and distributing relief supplies. Assistance to PVOs and NGOs included convoy escort, armed protection of relief and refugee centers, and guarding archeological sites.⁵⁷

In all of these missions, UNFICYP worked directly with the Cypriots and humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Red Crescent, and the United Nation's High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). For the Chief of OE, UNHCR and the Red Cross represented the bulk of his coordinating activity since these two organizations greatly assisted in the control of other PVOs/NGOs. This enhanced OE's ability to facilitate humanitarian operations. By reducing the number of organizations that required direct coordination, OE's limited staff was able to operate more effectively.⁵⁸

UN ALLIES IN UNFICYP. The Cyprus case study indicates that there are six areas for consideration when working with allies: 1) language and communication, 2) training levels and doctrine, 3) unit types and structures, 4) missions assigned or agreed upon by the nation's command authority, 5) unit leadership's view of the mandate and ROE, and finally, 6) other participants' hidden agendas.⁵⁹

In Cyprus, the majority of peacekeeping units either spoke English (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom) or had sufficient English speaking members in the ranks to function without major difficulties. Still, orders and reports had to be published in a variety of Scandinavian languages for Denmark, Finland, Sweden and German for Austria. This required that translators and liaison personnel be supplied to the UNFICYP headquarters from each

participating nation. It lengthened the time necessary to react in fast moving situations and required more planning, coordinating, and execution time than might normally be expected.⁶⁰

The nations involved with UNFICYP all provided units that were relatively well trained and capable of conducting the missions assigned. What difficulties existed occurred in the area of doctrine.⁶¹ The nations of Scandinavia have long had a political inclination towards neutrality. This has led to a doctrine that is fairly passive when dealing with armed confrontations in a peacekeeping situation. As already noted, UNFICYP suffered some embarrassment when Scandinavian units avoided conflicts between warring Greek and Turkish factions.⁶² This occurred because their doctrine stated that unless both parties agreed to the peacekeepers mediation, then the peacekeepers could not enforce the mandate, even when clearly authorized by the mandate itself, or the ROE, to use force. As one noted British correspondent stated, "it was unfortunate that unit sectors were not rotated on a regular basis to prevent such practices from continuing in certain areas." He went on to say that rotation would have put sterner units into those troublesome areas where passive units had allowed conditions to deteriorate.⁶³

Cyprus also demonstrated that considerations of unit type and missions authorized could be problematic. Some nations sent units only for specific type missions. No versatility or flexibility in missions was allowed. Others permitted great flexibility in missions during actual operations. For example, the UK, who had forces doing peacekeeping on Cyprus in late 1963 before UNFICYP, sent infantry units with armored vehicles. The British were prepared and willing to

conduct all manner of missions in Cyprus, ranging from constabulary tasks to combat. The British realized that their presence on the island helped prevent the escalation of the conflict to an intra-NATO war between Greece and Turkey. Additionally, the British maintained two large Sovereign Basing Areas or SBAs at Akrotiri in the south and at Dhekelia in the east.⁶⁴ Expansion of the conflict could have resulted in the loss of these SBAs and thus, the UK had every reason to want the peaceful coexistence of Greeks and Turks.

Austria and New Zealand, on the other hand, had no real interest in Cyprus. Their level and type of participation reflected this. Austria contributed only civilian police and medical personnel until early 1972 when an infantry battalion was added to replace the loss of the Irish battalion. New Zealand's contribution has always been just civilian police. As Lieutenant General (Ret) Lewis MacKenzie recently noted, the limits on the participation of combat forces of nations such as these is mostly likely due to limited resources.⁶⁵ However, as Austria's addition of infantry forces in 1972 indicates, it is also determined by changing domestic political agendas. In 1972, Kurt Waldheim (former Foreign Minister of Austria) took over as UN Secretary General. He thought that U Thant had acted too meekly in Cyprus.⁶⁶ Waldheim used his influence to get Austria to provide an infantry battalion to UNFICYP to show his support for tougher action on the UN's part.⁶⁷

The final element in determining the type units and missions supplied to UN operations such as UNFICYP concerns training. Sometimes, peacekeeping missions provide training that would otherwise be impossible at home station. For example, Austrian, Canadian, and Scandinavian units received good light infantry

and security training by their daily routines in Cyprus. At home this training may not have been possible to the extent available in the UN mission.⁶⁸ In many ways unit readiness was maintained on Cyprus while at the same time helping prevent war.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY IN UNFICYP. To discover the centers of gravity for Greek and Turkish Cypriots requires an examination of what caused the conflict in the first place. As already stated, tensions between Greek and Turk began in earnest after Cyprus' independence from the UK. When Greek Cypriot President Makarios attempted to institute majority rule on the island in late 1963, violence erupted on a large scale. Ethnic Greeks constituted 80 percent of Cyprus' population and would have surely succeeded in establishing majority rule over the Turkish minority if no outsiders had interfered.⁶⁹ Therefore, the center of gravity- the hub of all power and movement for Turkish Cypriots, was the benefactor relationship with the mother country, Turkey. The Greek Cypriot center of gravity was its sheer numbers, which allowed it to dominate the population, the economy, and to some extent the government of Cyprus.⁷⁰

UNFICYP's center of gravity at the time of establishment in 1964 was rooted in international politics. Much of the interest in preventing conflict in Cyprus came about as a result of the Cold War and Super Power competition.⁷¹ A conflict in Cyprus could develop into an intra-NATO war and alter the delicate balance of power in Europe. This was a clear threat to international peace and security and the UN Security Council recognized it as such.⁷² Therefore, UNFICYP's center of gravity was international support for peacekeeping in Cyprus.

To prevent war on Cyprus and possibly between Greece and Turkey, the UN Security Council adopted numerous resolutions, that keep UNFICYP in existence to this day.

Recent actions suggest that the center of gravity for UNFICYP is weakening. Passage of UNSCR 789 in March 1993 calls for a dramatic reduction in foreign troops on Cyprus and eventual termination of the UN mission.⁷³ Canada has already pulled its support for UNFICYP and others are following their lead. Currently, all contributors are reducing commitment to the UN mission.⁷⁴

The collapse of the Soviet Union altered the world's political situation and UNFICYP's center of gravity. The most important reason for UNFICYP's continuance now is based primarily on humanitarian factors.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, the centers of gravity for Greek and Turkish Cypriots remain unchanged and are not likely to differ in the foreseeable future. Ethnic conflicts in general are long-lived and the forces that sustain them are not easy to affect.

Many outside factors played a critical role in forming the centers of gravity in Cyprus. As seen there, a peacekeeper should understand the centers of gravity. The concept may help him determine the original causes of the conflict and why it continues. Identifying centers of gravity helps determine the sources of strength of each party. The peacekeeper may not be able to affect those sources or centers of gravity, but the analysis is useful. That analysis will help identify the areas that can and cannot be affected by the military instrument. Problem areas that could be solved by other elements of national or international power may be identified.

Additionally, a peacekeeper may be better able to protect his own center of gravity

by going through the mental analysis of determining friendly and belligerent parties' centers of gravity.

TRANSITION AND TERMINATION OF UNFICYP. Cyprus provides examples of both types of transitions previously listed in the doctrine section. The first transition to occur in Cyprus was that of the transfer of authority type. That transition occurred during March 1964 with the arrival of Canadian, Finnish, Irish, and Swedish troops, the incorporation of British troops into the UN force, and the establishment of UN command under Lieutenant General Gyani of India. Prior to that time, British forces stationed on the island prevented the escalation of the conflict to full blown war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.⁷⁶ FM 100-23 states that such a "hand over of operations and facilities should occur much like relief in place operations." This is precisely what happened in Cyprus. For the most part the change over went smoothly. This was because the units involved had sufficient relief in place doctrine. A weak doctrine, poorly trained unit, or unit unfamiliar with relief operations could have made transition difficult or caused the whole mission to fail. Another type of transition arises when there is no change in the forces, but a significant change in the UN mission. In Cyprus, this type transition occurred with the 1974 Turkish invasion.

A military coup by Greek Cypriot extremists in the National Guard, overthrew President Makarios' government on 15 July, 1974. These radical elements of the Greek Cypriot population posed an even greater threat to the Turkish minority on the island than before. As a result, Turkey invaded the island on 20 July, 1974 and eventually occupied the northern, predominantly Turkish

portion of Cyprus.⁷⁷ The mission of UNFICYP changed to deal with the new conditions. Instead of working throughout the island, conducting extensive patrolling, and having a daily presence in most Cypriots lives, UNFICYP's personnel were reduced to separating forces along an extended Green Line. This was because neither Greek nor Turkish communities wanted the UN soldiers in their territories. However, both did agree to a UN buffer zone as a means to prevent further violence. The UN buffer zone was a narrow corridor between the Turkish national army in the north and Greek Cypriot forces in the south. Military missions now resembled routine border duties more than traditional peacekeeping missions. Enthusiasm for the UN mission on the part of the contingents themselves waned. Training value decreased. Despite this, the disciplined and well led units of UNFICYP continued to successfully execute the UN mandate.⁷⁸

The final consideration in planning peacekeeping operations involves termination. As already stated, UNSCR 789 of March 1993 called for the reduction of foreign troops on Cyprus. It also outlined a five step process for furthering peaceful coexistence on Cyprus that would eventually lead to UNFICYP's termination. Some of these steps fall outside the purview of a peacekeeping force, but most apply directly to the role of the peacekeeper. First, the resolution called for a reduction in UNFICYP's deployed strength with a corresponding reduction in military expenditures by Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces. Second, UNSCR 789 called for what amounted to a more extensive UN Buffer Zone in order to reduce the chance of accidental contact between hostile forces. Third, the resolution called for both the Greek and Turkish authorities on

Cyprus to ease UN Buffer Zone crossing restrictions for clearly non-military traffic.

Fourth, the resolution called for both communities to promote "bi-communal" projects supported by the UN and other international organizations, to encourage long term healing of ethnic differences. Fifth, both communities were asked to submit to a UN sponsored census that could be used to resettle populations into more homogeneous regions and lessen the possibility of civil strife, primarily in areas on the current UN Buffer Zone.⁷⁹

To some extent, all of these steps will require support by UNFICYP military units in order to be implemented. The UN experience in Cyprus has been long term with many lessons that U.S. forces can use to their advantage. First, termination needs planning early in commitment to a peacekeeping operation. Termination requires the peacekeeper and the UN to define endstates for the mission. Without termination planning mission creep may set in. Second, termination will also include some sort of transition to local authorities. In Cyprus, this transition will be from the UN to Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and to Turkish military units still stationed on the island. Different plans will have to be developed for all three. On the Green Line, some sort of relief in place with local authorities will be needed.

Of all the lessons of Cyprus, perhaps the most obvious is that once an ethnic conflict gets started, it is very hard to stop. Likewise, any peacekeeping operation involved with it is likely to be long term. After 31 years, UNFICYP is still operating, preventing bloodshed between Greek and Turk in an intra-state

ethnic conflict. In 1978, just 200 miles to the southeast, an inter-state conflict was to develop that would also require a peacekeeping effort.

IV. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

BACKGROUND. The problems of the modern state of Lebanon are many and varied. The issues that caused the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 can be traced to the Palestinian problem in Israel. After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, many Palestinians were either forced to flee or chose to leave their homeland. Most settled in the Arab nations neighboring Israel. A sizable group settled in Lebanon with most Arab communities in the southern half of the nation.⁸⁰ Some of the Palestinians that settled in Lebanon became members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization or PLO. In the years between 1948 and 1978, the PLO supported an increasing array of terrorist acts and commando raids against Israel and Israeli citizens.⁸¹ On 11 March, 1978 a PLO commando raid near Tel Aviv killed 37 and wounded 76 Israeli citizens. Israeli intelligence linked the raid to PLO cells based in southern Lebanon.⁸²

In keeping with the Israeli policy of swift retribution for terrorist acts, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon on 14 March, 1978. The IDF occupied most of Lebanon south of the Litani River. Israel apparently intended to root out PLO base camps and establish a buffer zone in Lebanon to prevent further crossings of the border by terrorists and commando units. To complicate matters, the Syrians had forces in the area that were attempting to prevent Lebanon's on-going civil war from spilling over into Syria. On 15 March, 1978 the

government of Lebanon requested help from the UN Security Council in forcing IDF units back across the border to Israel. In response to Lebanon's request and at the United States' urging, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425. That resolution called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.⁸³

Within a few days, the UNSC appointed the Chief of Staff of another peacekeeping force in the area to command the new mission called for in UNSCR 425. Major General E.A. Erskine, a Ghanaian, became the first UNIFIL commander. Along with MG Erskine, most of the early UNIFIL staff came from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNTSO was the first ever UN peacekeeping operation. It had been in place observing the truce between Israel and neighboring Arab states since the war of 1948.⁸⁴ With MG Erskine's appointment, the UN Security Council moved swiftly to find member nations to provide the peacekeeping forces. The Council also established a planned end strength of 4,000 personnel. The initial forces came from Canada, Fiji, France, Iran, Ireland, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, and Sweden. In its lifetime, UNIFIL's composition has undergone many changes. Nations have removed their support or changed the type units allotted to UNIFIL, but through it all, the mission has retained a Chapter VI orientation.⁸⁵

MANDATE AND TERMS OF REFERENCE. The mandate under which UNIFIL operated was UNSCR 425. That resolution called for all UN member nations to respect the sovereign territory of Lebanon by withdrawing military forces from its soil. The Terms Of Reference issued by the UN Secretary General on 19

March, 1978 described how he envisaged the mandate's enforcement by UNIFIL.

The major components were:

to determine cessation of hostilities by Israel, to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, to assist the Lebanese government to restore its authority in the area, and to establish and maintain itself (UNIFIL) in an area of operations. The area of operations was to be defined through negotiations with the parties" (meaning -Lebanon, Israel, and the PLO).⁸⁶

In practical terms, the mandate and the Terms Of Reference meant that UNIFIL had to, as MG Erskine put it, "prevent infiltration of armed elements into the area by controlling movements."⁸⁷ Not only did armed elements mean Israelis, but also PLO members and splinter Lebanese factions. Similar to Cyprus, each player in the situation in south Lebanon had a different view of UNIFIL's mandate and mission. Where Cyprus was essentially an ethnic conflict, Lebanon was an issue of national sovereignty. The differing views on UNIFIL's mandate were primarily between nations or nation-states. As long as the involved nations felt issues of sovereignty were at risk, little could be done by the peacekeepers to enforce UNSCR 425 under chapter VI provisions.⁸⁸

The many Lebanese splinter groups operating in south Lebanon were, in most cases, not under the control of, or even recognized by the government in Beirut. Therefore, they represented a thorny problem for UNIFIL. Being Lebanese, none of the groups felt bound to abide by orders issued by the peacekeepers. The Lebanese splinter groups saw themselves as freedom fighters operating in their own country.⁸⁹ The actions of these Lebanese militias revealed a fundamental weakness' of UNIFIL. It was established as a UN Chapter VI

operation and according to the UN charter, such missions require the approval of all parties to the conflict.

UN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 38: Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, *if all parties to any dispute so request*, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.⁹⁰

As already noted, however, the Lebanese militias did not agree to UNIFIL's mission. In fact, they saw it as limiting their freedom of action.

Israel's understanding of the mandate and Terms Of Reference were based on their national security issues. In their view, UNIFIL needed to remove all Palestinians from south Lebanon and prevent any further crossings of the border by PLO terrorists and paramilitary groups. The IDF even suggested what the area of operations should be for UNIFIL. This required occupying Muslim controlled zones and staying out of the Lebanese Christian controlled areas under the leadership of Major Haddad. He was an ally of the Israelis and had strong connections to the IDF.

The area for UNIFIL's mandate suggested by the Israelis would allow the IDF to re-invade with little difficulty. By maintaining control of the Christian areas of south Lebanon, the IDF could attack towards Beirut to punish the PLO for any future terrorist raids or acts. Passing through UNIFIL would have proved difficult and the Israelis purposely suggested a solution that would allow them to avoid the UN's sector. This delineation of UNIFIL's sector was implemented with one exception. Israel did not completely withdraw from Lebanon. The IDF maintained a small security zone along the border and positioned itself to counter either threats from the PLO, or limitations on its freedom of action by UNIFIL.⁹¹

The PLO had yet another view of the mandate and Terms Of Reference. The PLO was recognized by all of the neighboring Arab countries as an independent nation. Yassir Arafat, leader of the PLO, felt that UNSCR 425 did not apply to him because of the Cairo Agreement of 1969. That agreement was between the PLO and Lebanon and authorized the PLO to conduct business in south Lebanon. Although Arafat promised to work with UNIFIL, in reality, PLO guerrillas made repeated attacks on UN positions. Additionally, the PLO contended that they should be allowed to maintain communities in UNIFIL's zone based on the humanitarian grounds cited in the same Cairo Agreement.⁹²

The problem with UNIFIL's mandate, from the beginning to this day, concerns the very nature of UN Chapter VI missions. As stated in Article 38, all parties must request and agree to a solution. With UNIFIL, no party other than the shaky Lebanese government in Beirut requested its presence or was properly consulted prior to insertion of the force. In most cases, UNIFIL inhibited the freedom of action of all parties in their pursuit of agendas and interests. Without prior agreements, no one felt a vested interest in the success of UNIFIL other than the UN itself.⁹³ In sending UNIFIL into Lebanon so early, the UN Security Council failed to follow its own charter, to seek and receive approval of all players concerned with the Chapter VI mission. The implications in such situations are that peacekeepers are at considerable risk with little chance of success. Force protection may require even more attention than it normally receives in traditional peacekeeping. Peacekeeping planners may need to anticipate future trouble with the mandate and the operation. Missions may need to be designed with this in

mind from the beginning. The ROE in particular may need careful analysis to anticipate future difficulties with belligerent parties.

UNIFIL ROE. The lesson that emerges from UNIFIL concerning ROE is that more than one set can develop, one formal, the other informal. The formal one typically develops in the manner described by FM 100-23. The UN Security Council authorized UNIFIL as a Chapter VI operation and established a formal ROE which included the use of force in self defense. Consequently, the Force Commander developed his ROE in line with these directives from the UN Security Counsel. As suggested by the mandate section above, however, not everyone agreed with the mission. As a result, their level of consent for UNIFIL was low.⁹⁴ This left UNIFIL personnel with a dilemma. They were conducting missions with self defense only ROE, in a situation where low consent by the belligerents made protection of their forces difficult.⁹⁵

The low consent for UNIFIL by nearly all parties in south Lebanon except the Lebanese government in Beirut, resulted in the development of an alternate set of ROE. In large measure, this came as a result of harassment and retaliation on UNIFIL personnel by Lebanese militia, the PLO and the Israelis. Lebanese militias would attack or ambush any national contingent that shot a militiaman, even if the UNIFIL personnel had followed their ROE correctly. Additionally, a system of blood money was demand of UNIFIL personnel anytime enforcement of its mandate or ROE did not suit a particular militia's agenda. UNIFIL personnel had to weigh the consequences of enforcing the official ROE, such as retaliatory ambushes or extortion, against the likely benefits of their actions. This meant that

in reality, ROE was highly local in character and true enforcement of the mandate was difficult.⁹⁶

Israelis and the PLO reacted to enforcement of the mandate and ROE by restricting movement with roadblocks of UNIFIL vehicles. This forced UN peacekeepers to escalate to a much higher level of violence or back down. Because UNIFIL's intent was to remain a Chapter VI operation, the latter almost always occurred. Backing down in such situations tended to weaken UNIFIL's credibility and made the mandate even less effective.⁹⁷

MEDIA, NGOs, AND PVOs. The problems concerning media relations in Lebanon were two fold. They are indicative of the many news challenges that any peacekeeping operation will face. Most media groups covering UNIFIL were from the countries that participated in the operation. Consequently, as in Cyprus, those press officials wanted news and human interest stories from their nation's contingent only. Media teams believed they had a right to direct access to their own countrymen. They did not feel inclined to coordinate their activities through the Press Information Office at MG Erskine's Force Headquarters in Naquoura, Lebanon. Coupled with the fact that MG Erskine and his staff were initially inexperienced with media matters, the press became very independent. This ran counter to the desired centralized coordination advocated in the Peacekeeper's Handbook. In fact, some of the impetus to centralize UN press releases comes from UNIFIL's experience in Lebanon.⁹⁸

Another result of a very independently minded press, was relatively high casualties in their ranks. Some groups operated in dangerous regions with no

escorts. They were subsequently either killed or wounded by the many independent armed factions. The deaths of newsmen tended to undermine their confidence in UNIFIL's mission and its ability to protect them. By 1979, however, UNIFIL's press information officer, Timur Goeksel established an effective centralized media relations system. Slowly, the media developed confidence in UNIFIL's handling of press issues. By the time of Israel's second invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Operation Peace for Galilee, UNIFIL's reputation of solid, accurate, and timely media briefings had been firmly established.⁹⁹ The other factions, governments, or organizations operating in south Lebanon were wildly biased and inaccurate in comparison with UNIFIL and this represented a major accomplishment and source of pride for MG Erskine and his staff.¹⁰⁰

The second media related issue in Lebanon concerned Israel's attempt to undermine UNIFIL's moral authority. Because Israel never really wanted UNIFIL's presence, it sponsored numerous programs designed to win the loyalty of Lebanese citizens in south Lebanon. If, as Israel believed, UNIFIL seemed totally ineffective to the Lebanese, then maybe the UN would withdraw support for the operation. Part of making UNIFIL look bad was to make the IDF look good. The Israeli government established medical, agricultural, and humanitarian services free of charge around the key villages in the south. At the same time, Israeli press releases touted the accomplishments of its actions in south Lebanon, while denigrating those of UNIFIL. To counter this strategy and maintain credibility, UNIFIL had to go on a media relations offensive to call attention to its own humanitarian efforts. Eventually, UNIFIL won this battle of public relations with Israel with the system

that Timur Goeksel established - one based on objectivity, unlimited access for the media, and honesty.¹⁰¹

Of all the duties performed by UNIFIL, the one considered most important and successful by the force commander was humanitarian assistance.¹⁰² Except for the Christian enclave of Major Haddad, most of south Lebanon was Shiite Muslim. This was also the most economically depressed region of the country. The principle PVOs and NGOs conducting humanitarian assistance in the area were the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).¹⁰³ All of these organizations worked with and to some degree under the direction of UNIFIL. The force's key contribution to those organizations consisted of security and mine clearing operations.

Because of the very violent nature of the militias and the large amount of unattended ordinance in Lebanon, these civilian groups needed military protection. Mine clearing was of extreme importance. Many areas were devoid of people, for fear of the mines. Agriculture collapsed because farmers were afraid to plow fields studded with unexploded cluster bomb units. As a result, UNIFIL cleared areas so that citizens could move back in and humanitarian services could be provided safely.¹⁰⁴

Another obstacle to bringing in civilian humanitarian agencies was the continued presence of heavily armed teenage males in the south. The problem was a vicious cycle. These young males were armed because the militias paid them to help control the countryside. Many would have preferred to work in a normal job,

but that could only happen in a safe and secure environment in which PVOs and NGOs operated. As long as the youths remained armed, it prevented the establishment of programs that could provide normal jobs. MG Erskine noticed this dilemma and designed a two phase solution. First, UNIFIL would come into an area to sweep for mines and ordinance. Then, its military forces could provide a secure environment for the short term. This allowed the PVO's and NGO's to enter and set up their services. UNIFIL was an enabling force for the NGOs and PVOs. MG Erskine encouraged them to stay for the duration by enacting a second program.¹⁰⁵

MG Erskine queried the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Mr. Dean, on the U.S.'s ability to fund a jobs training program. The U.S. government approved and the Lebanese YMCA started a vocational skills training program in the villages of the south. Much needed trades in carpentry, stonemasonry, and plumbing were taught. These trades were chosen because they represented the precise skills needed to repair the South's infrastructure. Then, other NGO's and PVO's funded the actual construction programs that were manned by reformed Lebanese youths.¹⁰⁶ Although these programs were social in nature, they could not have been started without the initiative of the UN commander and the protective presence of the military units of UNIFIL. This may look like mission creep, but the UN force commander felt it a necessary step towards preventing violence.¹⁰⁷ He believed that as long as the methods used did not violate the mandate, and resources were available, then the assistance given to humanitarian activities was justified and necessary.

UN ALLIES IN UNIFIL. The first nation to deploy a contingent to UNIFIL was France. French forces brought a number of contributions to the UN mission. France had long experience in the region and knew the difficulties of operating there. As a result, many Lebanese spoke French, thus easing language barriers for the French units. There was, however, some resentment among the Lebanese because of France's colonial legacy in their country.¹⁰⁸ The French and British invasion of Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis also caused the Arab world to mistrust European nations even as late as 1978. The force commander had to take care in how he used his French assets as a result of previous history.¹⁰⁹

Iran also deployed a force to Lebanon in the early stages of UNIFIL. Iran is a Muslim nation that is mainly Shiite. The majority of Lebanese in the south are also Shiite. As a result, the Iranian contingent had instant credibility with the south Lebanese. This was not the case when Iranian units operated in Christian held areas. On the whole, the Iranian force gave very effective and valuable support to UNIFIL when operating in Shiite areas, until it was withdrawn in 1979 due to the Iranian Revolution.¹¹⁰

The case of Iran offers the planner two lessons. First, there may very well be great wisdom in what many third world countries believe is the proper method of conducting peacekeeping operations. They propose that the UN General Assembly have more say in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. If this were implemented, the third world, primarily Africa and the Middle East, contends that the UN would lean towards regional orientation of peacekeeping missions. It is the third world's opinion that the best peacekeepers come from those nations that best

understand the culture, issues, and world view of the nation/s in conflict.¹¹¹ Iranian participation in Lebanon with UNIFIL is an example of this regional affinity, in this case manifested through a common religion, translating to effective peacekeeping. Such regional and cultural considerations should be accounted for during planning in order to maximize unit effectiveness and possibly foster greater neutrality for the peacekeeping force as a whole.

Second, a planner needs to take into account the likely continuity of a national contingent. For example, a peace operation campaign plan may need to assign critical long term missions only to those forces likely to remain a contingent for the duration. This is not to say that anyone in UNIFIL made a mistake in assigning Iran important missions. Very few people predicted the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent withdrawal of its forces from UNIFIL.¹¹² If a planner, however, can anticipate a force's longevity, then he ought to account for it in his plan.

The last nation to be examined is Fiji. The Fijians represent the type of nation that may attract trouble because of rigidity in enforcing the mandate. The Fijians' reputation was one of tenacity. MG Erskine considered them to be the most determined contingent of UNIFIL to enforce the mandate and ROE. The Fijians, also had more hostile contacts, shooting incidents, and casualties than any other force in UNIFIL. The PLO, in particular, singled out the Fijians for increased pressure. The PLO felt that Fijian soldiers' aggressive enforcement of the mandate made PLO fighters look weak and ineffective in the eyes of the Lebanese. Consequently, the PLO, always concerned about its image, fought back with

ambushes, bombings and extortion against the Fiji battalion (FIJIBATT). For MG Erskine, the adversarial relationship between FIJIBATT and the PLO represented his greatest worry, that UNIFIL would become either a Chapter VII operation or be terminated without success. As a result, he tried to place the Fijian unit in the most docile of UNIFIL's sectors in order to prevent further escalation.¹¹³

CENTERS OF GRAVITY. This section will identify the centers of gravity of the Lebanese government in Beirut, of Israel, of the PLO, and of UNIFIL and their implications for peacekeeping. For the government in Beirut, its center of gravity lay in its legitimacy. It had just come through a terrible civil war when the Israeli invasion necessitated the establishment of UNIFIL. Its main job then was to extend sovereignty over all its territory. If it could appear to the world and the average Lebanese that it was viable and fair, it would survive.¹¹⁴ The presence of so many armed camps on its soil made its center of gravity vulnerable. Without legitimacy, Lebanon would continue to lose territorial integrity and the violence would grow. A stable government was and still is, Lebanon's best chance for peace and UNIFIL's best chance for successful termination.¹¹⁵

The PLO's center of gravity lay in financial and military support from other Arab nations. If Yassir Arafat and the PLO lost funding and arms supplies, then the end would come quickly. But no nation or organization was able or wanted to attack the PLO's center of gravity. That would require Arabs to turn their back on a brother, not a very likely outcome.¹¹⁶ Even when Operation Peace for Galilee forced the PLO from Lebanon, Arafat continued to receive support in and from other Arab nations.¹¹⁷ Perhaps the only way that any party could have affected the

PLO was to politically eliminate Yassir Arafat, hoping that no strong leader would emerge after him. At any rate, that option was never very likely and certainly not realistic as a solution for the UN to pursue.

The PLO's center of gravity may have been out of reach of UNIFIL's ability to affect it. By determining that the PLO's center of gravity was its alliance with and support from other Arab nations, a peacekeeper could identify UNIFIL's limited options. UNIFIL had no authority to negotiate with other nations and therefore could not affect the PLO's center of gravity. Identifying a center of gravity, however, could be a valuable exercise by itself. It may help a planner identify the things that can be affected by peacekeeping operations and those things that cannot.

Israel's center of gravity lay in its overwhelming military superiority in the region. Coupled with a firm national will, its center of gravity was nearly impossible to affect and thwarted UNIFIL's successful execution of the mandate short of going to a Chapter VII operation. The only true lever on Israel was the U.S. If UNIFIL wanted to affect Israel's center of gravity and force it to comply with the mandate, then the U.S. had to weigh in heavily on the UN's side. That has not yet occurred and perhaps explains why the mandate remains only partially fulfilled.¹¹⁸

UNIFIL's center of gravity is much the same as UNFICYP's. As long as the UN, the United States, and participating nations see a need for the force then it will continue. Israel still maintains a buffer zone on Lebanese soil which is in violation of the original mandate. Lebanon still requires considerable support in

maintaining sovereignty and stability over its volatile southern region. At any rate, identifying centers of gravity is a useful exercise because it helps a planner understand the dynamics of his situation. With this analytical tool a planner may be able to protect his own center of gravity and identify the problems he cannot solve. Areas that could or should be solved by diplomatic, economic, or informational means may be identified and referred to the appropriate agency.¹¹⁹

TRANSITION AND TERMINATION. As already stated, UNIFIL continues today. Part of the planning for transition and termination must include defense and foreign aid packages to the official government of Lebanon. Security assistance and foreign internal defense (FID) measures will likely become important in the transition phase. When the day does come for the planner to write a concept for the end of a mission like UNIFIL, the Operations Other Than War (OOTW) principle of perseverance will be key. Transition will likely be a lengthy process. Redeployment, will need to take into account that effective security measures must be maintained by a viable Lebanese government and military. This implies an orderly and gradual transition to Lebanese control.¹²⁰ Termination in Lebanon, also requires endstates to be defined by the UN. Those endstates are already in the mandate for UNIFIL. If all outside powers were to withdraw from Lebanon, then UNIFIL's mandate would be fulfilled. As long as the Beirut government remains unable to provide stability in south Lebanon, then the IDF is unlikely to leave. UNIFIL illustrates that the problems that require the presence of a peacekeeping force are intractable and nearly impossible to solve without great effort, skill, and time.

V. Conclusions

UN operations continue in Cyprus and Lebanon to this day. UNFICYP is now 31 years old and UNIFIL is 17 years old. They demonstrate the extreme in the OOTW principle of perseverance. They are, however, valuable teaching vehicles for future peace operation campaign planners in the U.S. armed forces. This monograph has provided details to the five broad categories of peace operation campaign planning offered in FM 100-23. The author believes that those considerations have two important purposes. First, they are a good analytical tool to study past peace operations and second, they help a planner prepare for future missions. In the process of using them as an analytical tool, the monograph has identified some additional details for the five considerations in planning peace operation campaigns.

Understanding the mandate and the Terms Of Reference . This is the first and possibly the most important step to designing a successful peace operation campaign plan. Planners must realize that each faction is likely to have its own view of the mandate and the peacekeepers' mission. These views may be violently opposed to one another. Part of the peacekeepers mission will be to educate the disputing parties on the nature of Chapter VI operations and the specifics of the mandate. Additionally, the mandate may be rather vague in the early stages. Constant attention must be paid to UN Security Council resolutions and statements by the Secretary General as the operation continues.¹²¹ Such proclamations then have to be coordinated with each national contingent's command structure to insure

that they continue to agree to participate under the new guidance. In some cases, all parties to a conflict may not agree to the peacekeepers' presence. This makes for a difficult situation where success of the peacekeeping operation may be marginal or nonexistent. In such situations, force protection will need careful attention. A peacekeeping planner will need to be involved early on with ROE development and possibly with the mandate and Terms Of Reference.

Development of the ROE . A planner must carefully examine all statements from the UN. Sometimes guidance concerning ROE is issued in other than ROE documents. Continuous review of the ROE to see if it remains valid is important. ROE development is a complex matter as already acknowledged in U.S. Army doctrine. What is not so obvious, is that local conditions may result in ROE quite different than those established by the UN Security Council, force commanders or different national contingents. Peacekeepers in chapter VI operations are particularly vulnerable to extortion and threats of violence. Such intimidation could weaken the will to enforce the mandate and the ROE. If a planner notices that consent for the peacekeeping force is low, he should immediately reexamine the ROE to see if modifications are needed. And finally, a planner must determine what effect changing the ROE could or should have on the mandate and the daily conduct of operations.

Media, NGOs, PVOs, and UN partners be considered as primary players.

Planners should recognize the UN's desire to centralize press releases through the Press Information Office. FM 100-23, in media considerations, identifies several press concerns. The only significant difference between the press section of the

Peacekeepers Handbook and FM 100-23 concerns the role of the PIO. FM 100-23 does not address or even mention the PIO. Given the importance the UN places on the PIO's role in peacekeeping, a change or addition to the manual may be in order.¹²² The lesson learned from UNIFIL on the media is that centralized coordination of press relations and reporting is difficult and not well received. Despite this fact, a peacekeeping operation can be well served by a proactive, open, and honest program for dealing with the media. Such understanding is also valuable in working with humanitarian organizations. In many cases, the actions of humanitarian organizations help solve the problems that are the source of violence, e.g., unemployed and heavily armed individuals. Therefore, the military planner must consider these organizations in his operations because their success will frequently contribute to his.

A planner should follow the guidelines for media relations and humanitarian activities developed in UNFICYP and UNIFIL which are shown in chapter VIII and chapter XI of the Peacekeeper's Handbook. Because all peace operations are different and constantly changing, coordination with the media and humanitarian organizations requires constant if not daily updates and briefings.¹²³ In all dealings, the peacekeeper must remain open and honest. Additionally, peacekeepers must remember that people from these organizations are not military. A cooperative, less directive approach should provided better results with these types of organizations.

When considering UN partners, three factors apply. Understand that they have their own doctrine, training levels, and views of the mandate and ROE. Failure to properly account for these differences could scuttle the peacekeeping

mission. When assigning missions and sectors of responsibility consider past experience in the region and the likely longevity in the UN operation of each national contingent. Also, plan for longer execution and planning times because of language and cultural differences. Remember that additional liaison and translator personnel will be critical to effective coordination.

Consideration of friendly and belligerent centers of gravity is important.

In peacekeeping operations it may be that identifying the center of gravity is a valuable exercise in of itself. A peacekeeper may not be able to actually affect the centers of gravity, but at least he will understand all players' strengths and weakness' and why the conflict continues to exist. He may be able to tell what changes he can make to the causes of the conflict and where his efforts are likely to fail.

Additionally, he may be better able to protect his own center of gravity and thus ensure success of the UN's mission.

Plan for transition and termination of the UN mission. Transition can include hand over of a unilateral action to a UN peace operation or a significant change in the current mission, such as going from a UN chapter VI to UN chapter VII mission. In regards to termination, plan for the hand over of missions to local civilian authorities, humanitarian organizations, and indigenous military forces. Without early planning for transition and termination, success may be difficult and mission creep unavoidable.

In summary, UN peace operations are complicated and usually long term affairs. The more information a planner can gather on all parties' views of the issues, the more likely he is to design a successful campaign plan. FM 100-23's

planning factors for peace operations are valid, but more detailed knowledge is required in each area in order to succeed.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ The White House, A National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1994, pp 13-14.
- ² The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25. Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994, pg 4.
- ³ Ibid, pg 4.
- ⁴ Ibid, pp 4-5.
- ⁵ United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990. This conclusion on the most important types of PK missions is based on my survey of all the UN missions highlighted in this book.
- ⁶ David Cushman Coyle, The United Nations and How It Works. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1966, pg 228.
- ⁷ United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg XVI.
- ⁸ United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. Paraphrased from statement by former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in the forward pp XVI-XVII.
- ⁹ FM 100-23, pp 13-14.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, pg 17.
- ¹¹ Ibid, pp 1-2.
- ¹² Ibid, pg 31.
- ¹³ Ibid, pg 66.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, pp 69-73.
- ¹⁵ FM 100-23, pp 35-36.
- ¹⁶ UNESCO, International Dimensions of Human Rights. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988, pp 187-198.
- ¹⁷ FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, June 1993, pg 6-7.
- ¹⁸ FM100-23, pg 6-7.

- ¹⁹ Ibid, pp 23-28.
- ²⁰ Thomas Erlich, Cyprus 1958-1967: International Crises and the Role of Law. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1974, pg 1.
- ²¹ Ibid, pg 5-8. Enosis is the Greek word used to describe union with Greece. It was the concept put forward by Greek Cypriots. Taksim is the Turkish word used to describe partition of the island into two separate nations. It was the concept put forward by Turkish Cypriots.
- ²² United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pp 284-289.
- ²³ Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, pg 12.
- ²⁴ Ibid, pg 13.
- ²⁵ Robert Pitta, UN Forces 1948-1994. London: Reed Consumer Books Limited, 1994, pg 14.
- ²⁶ Thomas Erlich, Cyprus 1958-1967. pp 36-38. To understand a conflict requires understanding its causes. Additionally, my research indicates that to truly understand a UN mandate requires understanding the conflict and its causes, thus the discussion of the constitutional issues in Cyprus of late 1963.
- ²⁷ Max Harrelson, Fires All Around the Horizon. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1989, pg 168.
- ²⁸ Basil Zarov, Assignment Cyprus. New York, NY: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Volume 5, number 1, Autumn 1992, pp 31-33. Since Cyprus all demarcation lines have received this name. It came from a British officer that drew the original line on a map of Nicosia, separating Greek and Turk, with a green grease pencil.
- ²⁹ United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pp 286-289.
- ³⁰ United Nations, The Blue Helmets. After reviewing all UN operations up till 1990 no mention of the term, Terms Of Reference is found until the operations of the mid 1970's. All other sources for this monograph verify this finding.
- ³¹ Robert Pitta, UN Forces 1948-1994. pg 15.
- ³² United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 287.

- ³³ Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo. Douglas and McIntyre, Vancouver, BC, 1993, pp 39-41.
- ³⁴ Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1981, pp 82-85.
- ³⁵ R.R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. London: K. Rustem and Brothers, 1982, pp 30-35.
- ³⁶ United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pp 290-291. Included here are the parameters issued with the Secretary's September 1964 statement. They show how ROE was embedded with the TOR statement.
- a. The UN force is under exclusive control and command of the UN at all times.
 - b. The force undertakes no actions not consistent with UNSCR 186.
 - c. Weapons are only for self defense.
 - d. UNFICYP forces must act with complete impartiality towards Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
 - e. Self defense includes assisting other UNFICYP personnel under armed attack and always guidance of minimum force.
 - f. Examples of self defense: when faction attempts to force UNFICYP personnel to withdraw from a position, to disarm, and attempts to prevent them from carrying out their missions and orders.
- ³⁷ Max Harrelson, Fires All Around the Horizon. pp 170-173.
- ³⁸ James Sowerwine, Conflict in Cyprus from Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution. edited by David Charters, New Brunswick, Canada: Center for Sconflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1992, pp 45-47.
- ³⁹ Ibid, pg 46.
- ⁴⁰ David Cushman Coyle, The United Nations and How It Works. pg 228.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, pg 228.
- ⁴² Lewis MacKenzie offered this observation on 18 April, 1995 on Arts and Entertainment Channel's Investigative Reports: A Soldier's Peace .
- ⁴³ United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 293.

- ⁴⁴ Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary General: Making "The Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible. London: Praeger Publishers, 1993, pp 117-121.
- ⁴⁵ Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping. pp 89-90.
- ⁴⁶ Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping. pg 88.
- ⁴⁷ T.R. Fehrenbach, The United Nations in War and Peace. New York, NY: Random House, 1968, pp 166-172.
- ⁴⁸ FM 100-23, pg 15.
- ⁴⁹ James Sowerwine, Conflict in Cyprus. pp 45-46 and T.R. Fehrenbach, The United Nations in War and Peace. pg 168.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid, pg 46.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, pg 47.
- ⁵² Basil Zarov, Assignment Cyprus. pp 31 and 38.
- ⁵³ International Peace Academy, The Peacemaker's Handbook. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1984, pp 340-341. This is the UN approved manual for peacekeeping. included in this note are the rules concerning press relations. Peacemaker's Handbook, 1984: page 340-341: Press and the Peacekeeper.
- a. The Peacekeeper should be aware of the UN Press Information Office/Officer (PIO) on the Force/Mission Commander's Staff.
 - b. It is important for the PIO and the national contingents to have a trusting and understanding relationship.
 - c. The press should not be obstructed in its attempts to obtain information. Encroachment on sensitive UN missions by the press will require the advice of the PIO in determining solutions.
 - d. Force/Mission Commanders should brief the press regularly on on-going missions.
 - e. Approval for national contingent commanders to talk to the press should be cleared with the PIO first.
 - f. Only authorized personnel should make statements to the press.
 - g. Danger is not a reason to be used to prevent the press from going to the scene of an incident. The individual pressman makes the decision.
 - h. Consider all statements "on the record." National contingent commanders and staff officers should only make statements concerning background information. The Force/Mission Commander is responsible for statements of policy and critical information.

i. Exercise restraint in making statements. Off the cuff remarks made in haste or under pressure can be damaging to the UN mission.

- ⁵⁴ Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping. pp 88-89.
- ⁵⁵ International Peace Academy, The Peacekeeper's Handbook, pg 340.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, pg 237.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid, pp 237-244. Included is the complete list from the handbook.
1. Assist PVOs/NGOs in the provision of relief supplies and food.
 2. Provide military observers/escorts to facilitate agricultural activity.
 3. Negotiate the harvesting of crops in disputed areas.
 4. Liaison between belligerents for the sale of durable goods.
 5. Arbitrate disputes over land, water rights, and movement rights for people and animals.
 6. Negotiate the restoration of public utilities.
 7. Resettle displaced persons.
 8. Assist in repair of schools, churches, and public property.
 9. Arrange for education of children in disputed areas.
 10. Arrange medical/health services in disputed areas.
 11. Protect and help restore antiquities and archeological sites.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, pp 245-250.
- ⁵⁹ United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pp 291-300.
- ⁶⁰ Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future. New York, NY: Yale University Press, 1974, pp 102-104.
- ⁶¹ Ibid, pg 103.
- ⁶² Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping. pg 90.
- ⁶³ Ibid, pp 91-92.
- ⁶⁴ Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper. pp 27-33.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid, pp 332-333.
- ⁶⁶ Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordener, The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary General. pp 121-124.
- ⁶⁷ United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 300.

- ⁶⁸ Lewis MacKenzie, pp 32-37.
- ⁶⁹ Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus: 1958-1964. pg 62. This evaluation is made on the basis of Ehrlich's assessment of the Turkish Cypriots' situation in early 1964.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid, pp 41-55.
- ⁷¹ Richard Nyrop, editor, Turkey: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Foreign Area Studies, American University, July 1979, pp 58-60.
- ⁷² United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 285.
- ⁷³ United Nations Dept. of Public Information, Cyprus: Status Quo not Acceptable. New York, NY: UN Chronicle Magazine, March 1993, Vol. XXX, no. 1, pg 69.
- ⁷⁴ United Nations Dept. of Public Information, Cyprus: Talks Continue, UNFICYP Funding Changed. New York, NY: UN Chronicle Magazine, September 1993, Vol. XXX, no. 3, pp 46-47.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid, pg 47.
- ⁷⁶ Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping. pp 75-82.
- ⁷⁷ Richard Nyrop, editor, Turkey: A Country Study. pp 63-66.
- ⁷⁸ Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper. pp 75-78.
- ⁷⁹ United Nations Dept. of Public Information, Cyprus: Status Quo not Acceptable. New York, NY: UN Chronicle Magazine, March 1993, Vol. XXX, no. 1, pg 69.
- ⁸⁰ Avi Becker, The United Nations and Israel: From Recognition to Reprehension. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988, pp 49-53.
- ⁸¹ Ibid, pp 80-85.
- ⁸² United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 111.
- ⁸³ Bjorn Skogmo, UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, pg 8.
- ⁸⁴ LtGen. Emmanuel A. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections. New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1989, pp 14-15 and 41-42.

- 85 United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pp 427-438.
- 86 LtGen. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pg 20.
- 87 Ibid, pg 33.
- 88 Bjorn Skogmo, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. pg 9.
- 89 LtGen. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pp 40-43.
- 90 David Cushman Coyle, The United Nations and How It Works. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1966, pg 228.
- 91 Bjorn Skogmo, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. pp 23-28.
- 92 Thomas Collelo, editor, Lebanon: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, 1989, pp 28-32.
- 93 LtGen. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pp 37-39.
- 94 Bjorn Skogmo, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. pp 22-24.
- 95 LtGen Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pp 43-44.
- 96 Ibid, pp 44-45.
- 97 United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 145.
- 98 Bjorn Skogmo, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. pp 145-146.
- 99 Ibid, pg 145.
- 100 LtGen Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pg 92.
- 101 Ibid, pp 88-91.
- 102 Ibid, pg 88.
- 103 Thomas Collelo, editor, Lebanon: A Country Study. pp 52-53.
- 104 LtGen Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pg 91.
- 105 United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pp 152.
- 106 LtGen Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pp 89-90.
- 107 Ibid, pp 90.

- 108 Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping. pp 131-133.
- 109 Thomas Collelo, editor, Lebanon: A Country Study. pp 19 and 22.
- 110 LtGen Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pp 88-89.
- 111 Ocaya-Lakidi, Dent, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military: UN and U.S. Military Roles in Regional Organizations in Africa and the Middle East. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994, pp 175-177.
- 112 Bjorn Skogmo, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. pp 131 and 138.
- 113 LtGen Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL. pp 114-121.
- 114 United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 152.
- 115 Ibid, pp 151-152.
- 116 Thomas Collelo, editor, Lebanon: A Country Study. pp 196-203.
- 117 Ibid, pg 202.
- 118 United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pg 152.
- 119 Rikhye, Harbottle, Egge, The Thin Blue Line. pg 314.
- 120 FM 100-23, pp 18-19.
- 121 United Nations, The Blue Helmets. pp 3-9. This opinion is based on review of the history of 13 peacekeeping operations in this book. In each case the mandate took anywhere from six months to a year to formalize. Long term missions tended to have an evolving mandate.
- 122 International Peace Academy, The Peacekeeper's Handbook. pg 340.
- 123 FM 100-23. pp 29-32 and 47-48.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Articles

Arnold, S.L. MG, USA and Stahl, David T., MAJ, USA, A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War. Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Parameters, Winter 1993-1994.

Bolton, John R., Wrong Turn in Somalia. New York: Foreign Affairs Magazine, Jan/Feb 1994.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations, 1992.

Dworken, Jonathan T., Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters Dept. of the Army, Military Review, Sep 1994.

Heiberg, Marianne and Johan J. Holst. 'Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Comparing UNIFIL and MNF'. Survival (September/October 1986): pp. 399-422.

Johansen, Robert C. 'UN Peacekeeping: The Changing Utility of Military Force'. Third World Quarterly 12 (April 1990): pp. 53-70.

Kahan, Jerome H., Institute for National Strategic Studies, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military: Peace Support Operations: Senior Military Perspectives. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

Kolb, Richard K., Combat in the Somalia Sinkhole. Kansas City, MO.: VFW Magazine, Feb 1994.

Kutter, Wolf D. Operational Guidelines for US Peacekeeping Commanders: An Individual Study Project. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1986.

Lewis, Paul. 'U.N. Cautions Turks and Greeks Cyprus Peace Force May Collapse'. New York Times, 12 April 1992, p. 13.

McCaffrey, Barry R., GEN, USA, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military: U.S. Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

McCain, John, Senator, U.S. Congress, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military: The Proper U.S. Role in Peacemaking. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

McDonald, Robert, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Problem of Cyprus. London: Brassey's Publishers, 1989.

McVittie, M.R. 'With the Irish in UNIFIL'. British Army Review 86 (Aug. 1987): pp. 39-45.

Ocaya-Lakidi, Dent, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military: UN and U.S. Military Roles in Regional Organizations in Africa and the Middle East. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

Stanton, Martin N., MAJ, USA, Task Force 2-87: Lessons from Restore Hope. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters Dept. of the Army, Military Review, Sep 1994.

United Nations 'UNIFIL Mandate Extended'. UN Chronicle (December 1991): p. 38. [UN Security Council authorizes operation of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon until 31 January 1992].

United Nations Cyprus: Status Quo Not Acceptable. UN Chronicle (March 1993, Vol XXX, no. 1) pg 69.

United Nations Cyprus: Talks Continue, UNFICYP Funding Changed. UN Chronicle (September 1993, Vol XXX, no. 3) pp 46-47

Walsh, Kenneth T. and Borger, Gloria, The Unmaking of Foreign Policy. New York, NY: US News and World Report Magazine, Oct 18, 1993.

Zarov, Basil, Assignment Cyprus. New York, NY: The Quarter Journal of Military History, Volume 5, number 1, Autumn 1992, pp. 30-39.

Books

Becker, Ava, The United Nations and Israel: From Recognition to Reprehension. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988.

Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

Erskine, Emmanuel A. LtGen. Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections. New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1989.

Collelo, Thomas, editor, Lebanon: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, 1989.

Coyle, David Cushman, The United Nations and How it Works. New York, Columbia University Press, 1966.

Denktash, R.R. The Cyprus Triangle. London: K. Rustem and Brothers, 1982.

Erlich, Thomas, Cyprus 1958-1967: International Crises and the Role of Law. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Fehrenbach, T.R. The United Nations in War and Peace. New York, NY: Random House, 1968.

Harrelson, Max, Fires All Around the Horizon. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1989.

International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1984.

MacKenzie, Lewis, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo. Vancouver, BC: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993.

Nyrop, Richard, editor, Turkey: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1980.

Murphy, John F. The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: A Legal and Political Analysis. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1982.

Pitta, Robert, UN Forces: 1948-1994. London: Reed Consumer Books Limited, 1994.

Rikhye, Jit Indar, Michael Harbottle, Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future. New York, NY: Yale University Press, 1974.

Rivlin, Benjamin and Leon Gordenker, The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making "The Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible. London: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

Skogmo, Bjorn, UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.

Sowerwine, James, Conflict in Cyprus from Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution edited by David Charters. New Brunswick, Canada: University of New Brunswick, 1992.

Thompson, Sir Robert, War in Peace: Conventional and Guerilla Warfare Since 1945. New York, NY: Harmony Books, 1981.

UNESCO, International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988.

United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990.

Documents

After Action Report, U.S. Army Forces Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (LI). Fort Drum, NY: Headquarters 10th Mountain Division, 2 June 1993.

Coordinating Draft, U.S. Army Forces in Support of UNOSOM II. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 1994.

Lessons Learned Report, Operation RESTORE HOPE: 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 7 May 1993.

The White House, A National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1994.

The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, May, 1994.

Manuals

Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, June 1993.

Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 5 December 1990.

Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, December 1994.